As India and China mark 75 years of diplomatic ties, we find ourselves not merely at a commemorative milestone but also at a pivotal juncture in Asian and global geopolitics. The relationship, once rooted in idealistic visions of Asian solidarity, has become a tightrope walk across a landscape defined by contested borders, strategic rivalry and deep mistrust. Yet, it is also a relationship layered with opportunities for cooperation, economic interdependence and a shared responsibility for regional stability.
The ‘China lens’, the challenge
At the heart of this complex engagement is the stark reality that China is today the single most influential external factor shaping India’s foreign policy. From border infrastructure to trade diversification and defence cooperation, nearly every strategic decision India makes is filtered through the “China lens”. It is a structural challenge — one that requires us to balance deterrence with dialogue, sovereignty with economic interdependence, and competition with calibrated coexistence.
The 1962 war remains a traumatic marker in our bilateral history, reinforced in 2020 by the deadly Galwan Valley clash, which reopened old wounds and catalysed a shift in India’s China policy. No longer can engagement paper over our fundamental differences. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) remains tense, heavily militarised and vulnerable to miscalculation. Over 60,000 troops are now permanently deployed in Eastern Ladakh, while both countries continue to fortify infrastructure on their respective sides.
Yet, military vigilance is only one piece of the puzzle. India’s trade imbalance with China touched almost $100 billion in 2024-25; yet, Beijing is one of India’s largest trading partners. Despite efforts to ban Chinese apps and restrict certain investments, we remain economically entangled. Our dependence on Chinese components in sectors such as pharmaceuticals and electronics highlights a paradox: we deter at the border but depend on the marketplace. Full decoupling is neither feasible nor desirable in the short term.
This is why India’s approach has evolved into what can best be described as “competitive coexistence”. We seek to compete with China in defence, infrastructure and regional influence, while maintaining enough engagement given the constraints of economic decoupling. On platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), India and China engage as equals. In the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, the U.S.), India partners with like-minded democracies to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific. The key lies in maintaining agency and ensuring control over potentially adversarial situations. Our neighbourhood reflects the intensity of this competition. China’s growing footprint in South Asia — from the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka to the Pokhara Airport in Nepal and large infrastructure loans in the Maldives — has challenged India’s traditional role as the regional anchor. While India has responded with development aid, defence cooperation, and connectivity projects, and demonstrating its effectiveness as first-responder in times of crisis, it must now go beyond reactive diplomacy to proactive, long-term engagement that wins hearts, not just headlines.
The recent remarks made by Bangladesh’s interim leader Mohammad Yunus in Beijing — highlighting India’s northeast as landlocked — were diplomatically charged. Although geographically accurate, the setting and subtext have raised concerns in New Delhi. Comments such as these reinforce China’s strategic framing and underline the urgency for India to close infrastructure gaps, build trust with neighbours, and present itself as an even more reliable and responsive regional partner. Influence today is as much about narratives as it is about roads and ports.
The America factor
India’s position on China is further complicated by the return of Donald Trump to the White House. Mr. Trump’s second term has revived unilateralism, weakened multilateralism, and sharpened U.S.-China rivalry. India may well find itself under pressure to align more closely with Washington, especially in defence cooperation and Indo-Pacific security. Yet, we must tread carefully. Strategic autonomy remains India’s north star — and deeper ties with the U.S. must be balanced with the need to manage any boiling-over of antagonism with China.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s remarks on the Lex Fridman podcast in March 2025 signalled a subtle recalibration. By evoking ancient India-China synergy and emphasising dialogue, he articulated a vision of “healthy competition” and mutual growth. While some see this as conciliatory, it is better understood as strategic storytelling — a message to Beijing that India is open to engagement, a signal to Washington of independent judgement, and a reassurance to domestic audiences of a steady hand at the helm.
China’s response was positive. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning and state media welcomed Mr. Modi’s “pragmatic approach”, reinforcing a rare moment of diplomatic alignment. Verification patrolling along the LAC resumed in January 2025, signalling tentative steps toward de-escalation. China has agreed to hold an early meeting of the Expert Level Mechanism on hydrological data-sharing on rivers, and discussions are underway to reopen the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and restart direct flights. These may appear symbolic, but they indicate that both sides are testing waters for limited rapprochement — what one might call a thaw without illusions.
However, the underlying risks remain unchanged. The planned dam by China on the Yarlung Tsangpo (the Brahmaputra) near Arunachal Pradesh has rekindled concerns about ecological security and water weaponisation. India has no water-sharing treaty with China, and transparency remains low. The potential for mismanagement — or deliberate manipulation — of water flows presents a new dimension to the bilateral equation, one where sovereignty, environment, and mis-trust intersect in volatile ways.
The framework of a China policy
India’s China policy must therefore rest on four pillars: military readiness, economic diversification, diplomatic engagement, and narrative control. We must deter without provoking, trade without depending, and ensure skilful negotiation to safeguard interests. This demands sharper strategic communication, faster execution of regional projects, and a foreign policy mindset that thinks in decades, not just headlines. As India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri recently said, the “three mutuals” — respect, sensitivity, and interest — must guide our way forward.
In a recent oped in The Straits Times (April 10, 2025), this writer had proposed that India and China embrace a model of “competitive coexistence” — not to downplay our rivalry, but to manage it responsibly. Asia can no longer rely solely on U.S. leadership in an era of global disruption. It needs a home-grown security architecture where India and China act as custodians of stability. For that, we must build guardrails — military, diplomatic, and economic — to prevent friction from becoming fire.
As we mark 75 years of bilateral ties, let us not be bound by nostalgia or ceremony. This is a moment for strategy, not sentiment. India’s goal must be clear: to define its place in a world reshaped by flux, rivalry, and shifting alliances. China will remain a structural challenge — but it is also a mirror, forcing us to confront our capabilities, choices, and ambitions. In that mirror, we must see not a straitjacket, but an opportunity for India to lead.
(Adapted from the Gaston Sigur Memorial Lecture delivered by the writer at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington DC, on April 15, 2025)
Nirupama Rao is a former Foreign Secretary
Published – April 22, 2025 12:16 am IST